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Gijs van Dijck* 
 




Empirical legal research in the UK and in the Netherlands has provided data on the 
extent to which the transaction avoidance rules (avoidance powers, actio Pauliana) 
generate practical problems. This article’s goal is to explore the similarities and 
differences of the data. To achieve this, existing empirical data found in the Dutch 
and the UK research are compared.  
 From the comparison, it follows that the UK and The Netherlands share 
similar problems, i.e. there are no proceeds in a substantial number of cases in which 
the office-holder (or liquidator) encounters a suspect transaction, the majority of the 
disputes are conducted in the shadow of the law, proceeds are obtained more often from 
settlements than from proceedings, insufficient funds and evidence problems are 
experienced as major obstacles for successfully invoki g the transaction avoidance 
rules, and a presumption or shift of burden of proof influences the outcome 
significantly. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 
 
1.1 Introduction 
If a company strives to survive financial difficulties, some creditors often protect 
themselves at the expense of other, less powerful ceditors. For example, security 
rights will be granted to powerful creditors in orde  to reassure them. Occasionally, 
such a transaction can be detrimental to creditors. 
                                                  
* Lecturer at Tilburg University and member of the Tilburg Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies of 
Civil Law and Conflict Resolution Systems (TISCO) and the Research Group for Methodology of Law 
and Legal Research. E-mail: G.vanDijck@uvt.nl. The author thanks Reinout Vriesendorp for his useful 
comments on drafts of this article. 
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 Transaction avoidance rules (avoidance powers, actio Pauliana) provide 
criteria for qualifying transactions that are detrimental to the interests of creditors. If 
the criteria for permissibility are not satisfied, the transaction is reversed in order to 
restore the position of the estate. Most law system have adopted and implemented 
transaction avoidance rules.1 
   
1.2 Research field and research question 
Many studies have been conducted with regard to transaction avoidance rules. The 
majority of the studies concern descriptions of, or c mments on, current law. This 
unquestionably applies to UK2, German3 and Dutch4 law. They are generally written 
in the language of this system, e.g. English, German, or Dutch. 
 Studies that have addressed other issues, for example the rationale, are scarce. 
Several attempts have been made to justify the existence of transaction avoidance 
rules. The “pari passu” principle is often considered as the underlying principle of the 
transaction avoidance rules.5 Jackson6, however, used the creditors’ bargain theory to 
                                                  
1 For examples, see P.R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency Law, Sweet & Maxwell: 
London 2007, pp. 470-471 and pp. 523-538. See also the special issue of the International Insolvency 
Review (2000, Vo. 9, nr. 1), which contains descriptions f transaction avoidance rules in various countries, 
such as Australia, Germany, The Netherlands, and South Africa. 
2 For example, L. Sealy, D. Milman, Annotated Guide to the Insolvency Legislation 2006/2 07, vol. 1, 
Sweet & Maxwell 2006, pp. 257-276; H. Bennett, J. Armour (eds.), Vulnerable transactions in 
corporate insolvency, Oxford: Hart 2003; Ian F. Fletcher, The law of insolvency, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell 2002; Andrew Keay, ‘Transactional avoidance: ritical aspects of English and Australian law’, in: 
Ian F. Fletcher (Ed.), International Insolvency Review, Vo. 9, 2000/1, pp. 5-36; Ian F. Fletcher, ‘Voidable 
transactions in bankruptcy: British law perspectives’, in: Jacob S. Ziegel (ed.), Current developments in 
international and comparative corporate insolvency law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1994. For a more 
reflective approach, see R.M. Goode, Principles of corporate insolvency law, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
2005, p. 409-509. 
3 For example, D. Eickmann et al., Heidelberger Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung, Heidelberg: C.F. 
Müller Verlag 2003; H. Hess et al., Kommentar zur Insolvenzordnung: band 1 Insolvenzordnung, 
Heidelberg: Müller Verlag 2001; G. Kuhn et al., Konkursordnung: Kommentar, München: Vahlen 1994; W. 
Uhlenbruck, Das neue Insolvenzrecht: Insolvenzordnung und Einführungsgesetz nebst Materialien: mit 
Praxishinweisen, Herne/Berlin: Verlag für die Rechts- und Anwaltspraxis 1994; V Gessner et al., Die Praxis 
der Konkursabwicklung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: eine rechtssoziologische Untersuchung, Köln: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsges.mbH 1978. 
4 For example N.J. Polak, M. Pannevis, Faillissementsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2005; B. Wessels, 
Insolventierecht. Deel III. Gevolgen van faillietverklaring (2), Deventer: Kluwer 2003; F.P. van Koppen, 
Actio pauliana en onrechtmatige daadvordering (diss. Tilburg), Kluwer: Deventer 1998; A. van Hees, 
‘Voorwaarden voor het instellen van de Pauliana’, in: L. Timmerman (red.), Vragen rond de 
faillissementspauliana, Deventer: Kluwer 1998, pp. 1-11; J.J. van Hees, ‘Enkele Pauliana-perikelen’, in: 
S.C.J.J. Kortmann et al. (eds.), Onderneming en 5 jaar Nieuw Burgerlijk Recht, Deventer: Tjeenk Willink 
1997, pp. 567-576;  
5 For example, R.M. Goode, Principles of corporate insolvency law, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2005, p. 
411-413, who also considers unjust enrichment and deterrence as underlying policies of the transaction 
avoidance rules. Other sources are R.J. Mokal, Corporate insolvency law: Theory and application , 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005; N.J. Polak, M. Pannevis, Faillissementsrecht, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2005, pp. 98-99; B. Wessels, Insolventierecht. Deel III. Gevolgen van faillietverklaring (2), 
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explore and define the rationale of the transaction avoidance rules. In short, this 
theory explains bankruptcy as if it were the most effici nt mechanism that creditors 
would develop if there were no bankruptcy rules.  
 On an international level, comparative research has been done. In a special 
issue of the International Insolvency Review, different authors described the 
transaction avoidance rules that have been adopted by Australia, the UK, Germany, 
The Netherlands, and South Africa.7 A similar inventory was made for the transaction 
avoidance rules in various countries, and principles were derived from the studies.8 
For example, the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, published in 2005 by Uncitral, 
includes an overview of different types of transaction avoidance rules that are 
commonly used in various countries.9 In addition, this report reflects on these rules by 
outlining experiences with certain types of rules. The experiences are based on 
observations of individual reporters in the various countries.  
 The purpose of this research was “to assist the establi hment of an efficient 
and effective legal framework to address the financial difficulty of debtors”. 
Therefore, it should be used “as a reference by natio l authorities and legislative 
bodies when preparing new laws and regulations or reviewing the adequacy of 
existing laws and regulations”.10  
 The Uncitral Guide11 commences by stating there are substantial differenc s 
between insolvency laws with regard to how the rules are defined and how they are 
combined. Rather than describing the different rules, the Guide reduces them to two 
types of criteria, viz., objective and subjective criteria. Objective criteria are defined 
as general(ized) criteria that may be easier to apply than criteria that rely upon 
knowledge or intentions. According to the Guide, objective criteria can produce 
arbitrary results if relied upon exclusively. For example, if suspect periods are applied 
in a law system, a proper transaction that falls within a specified period might be 
                                                                                                                                               
Deventer: Kluwer 2003; J.B. Huizink, Insolventie, Deventer: Kluwer 2002, p. 80; G.W. van der Feltz, 
Geschiedenis van de Wet op het faillissement en de surséance van betaling (deel I), Haarlem: Erven F. 
Bohn 1896, p. 433. 
6 T.H. Jackson, ‘Avoiding powers in bankruptcy’, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 725 (1984), nos. 727-728. 
7 I.F. Fletcher (Ed.), International Insolvency Review, Vol. 9, 2000/1. 
8 P.R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency Law, Sweet & Maxwell: London 2007 pp. 458-
538; W.W. McBryde et al., Principles of European insolvency law, Deventer: Kluwer 2003, pp. 53-57. 
9 Uncitral, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, New York 2005, 
<http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf> (last accessed on 2th April 
2008). 
10 Uncitral, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, New York 2005, p. 1. 
11 Uncitral, Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, New York 2005, p. 137-141. 
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voided. On the other hand, preferential transactions that fall just outside this period 
are protected. 
 Examples of subjective, case-specific criteria are the intent of the parties to the 
transaction, the financial circumstances of the debtor at the time the transaction 
occurred, the financial effect of the transaction on the debtor’s assets and what might 
constitute the normal course of business between th debtor and particular creditors. 
According to the researchers, evidence problems are often related to subjective 
criteria. For instance, it is difficult to prove the debtor’s or the counterparty’s 
intention. 
 Therefore, the Guide advises to combine both objective and subjective crit ria. 
For example, “suspect periods” could be defined in which it is presumed that the 
debtor or his counterparty has the knowledge that is required to successfully void a 
transaction. Additionally, the drafters note that funding difficulties can obstruct the 
application of transaction avoidance rules. In legal systems where the assets of the 
debtor provide funds for legal proceedings, lack of funds can prevent the liquidator 
from instigating legal proceedings. 
 The information that the Uncitral Guide provides is, however, general and 
abstract. It particularly focuses on types of criteria and their general implications. 
Neither the Guide nor other comparative studies provide quantitative or other, more 
specific qualitative data that support their findings. As a result, it remains unclear to 
what extent transaction avoidance rules generate practical problems. This paper 
addresses the question to what extent transaction av idance rules generate practical 
problems. In order to answer this question, empirical data are required.  
   
1.3 Approach 
Recently, the application of the Dutch transaction avoidance rules has been studied 
empirically.12 The study focused on the results (proceeds) of settlements and 
proceedings, and on the problems that occur if the rul s are applied in practice. As 
UK research also provides empirical data13,  comparison can be made of the existing 
empirical studies. 
                                                  
12 G. van Dijck, De Faillissementspauliana: Revisie van een relict, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
2006.  
13 D. Milman & R. Parry, ‘A study of the operation of transactional avoidance mechanisms in corporate 
insolvency practice’, ILA Research Report, 1998. 
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 The comparison will concentrate on the incidence of suspect transactions, 
settlements and avoidance litigation and the difficult es that office-holders (or 
liquidators) experience if they encounter a suspect transaction, including the incidence 
and reasons for not initiating legal proceedings, evidential difficulties and disputes 
that take place between the liquidator and the counterparty.  
 Firstly, however, the transaction avoidance rules of UK and Dutch law will be 
described. A proper understanding of the UK and Dutch transaction avoidance rules is 
required in order to place the empirical results in the correct legal context. The 
description is followed by an analysis of the results that the UK and Dutch empirical 
studies have produced. Such an analysis will provide more detailed information in 
addition to the remarks and conclusions that were produced in earlier studies, 
particularly the Uncitral Guide. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY OF THE EMPIRICAL DATA COLLECTED 
 
2.1 United Kingdom (UK) 
In the UK, a need was felt for empirical data with regard to the transaction avoidance 
rules.14 However, the court service has not collected data on transactional avoidance 
orders. In addition, the Insolvency Service offers no insight into how the transaction 
avoidance rules are applied. Therefore, in 1996, the researchers turned to practitioners 
to examine how the law was being operated in practice, emphasizing the limitations 
of collecting perceptions of practitioners.15 
With the moral (and financial) support of the Insolvency Lawyers’ 
Association, a questionnaire was directed to 555 practitioners, both lawyers and 
accountants. When the questionnaire asked for indications concerning  frequencies, 
for example as to the incidence of avoidance proceedings, five different categories 
were distinguished, viz., ‘usually’ (70-100% of cases), ‘often’ (40-69%), ‘sometimes’ 
(10-39%), ‘rarely’ (9% or fewer) and ‘never’ (0%). 
The response rate of the survey was 26% (n=143). If the number of 
practitioners is added who said they were unable to participate, the response rate nears 
40%. In addition, approximately 30 interviews were h ld with leading practitioners 
                                                  
14 D. Milman & R. Parry, ‘A study of the operation of transactional avoidance mechanisms in corporate 
insolvency practice’, ILA Research Report 1998, p. 5. 
15 D. Milman & R. Parry, ‘A study of the operation of transactional avoidance mechanisms in corporate 
insolvency practice’, ILA Research Report 1998, pp. 5-6 and p. 22. 
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from various parts of the country. Provisional conclusions were successively tested by 
means of interviews and written consultation. 
 
2.2 The Netherlands (NL) 
Luttikhuis and the Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; CBS) 
have studied the completed case administrations of 2004.16 Consequently, the study 
consisted of a total of 4,165 bankruptcy files, 3,086 of which concerned legal entities 
and 1,079 of which involved natural persons.  
A second empirical study addressed the question to what extent the application 
of the Dutch transaction avoidance rules have led to practical problems.17 This study 
was conducted in 2005 and consisted of a survey and three focus groups which 
consisted of practitioners specialised in insolvency. After two reminders, the survey 
response rate was 33%: 173 of the 530 practitioners that were approached responded. 
Most of the respondents (73%) acted as an office-holder (or liquidator) and as an 
advisor or an attorney of a counterparty on a regular basis. One quarter had 
experience purely as an office-holder (or liquidator), merely 2% as an advisor or an 
attorney. 
 The survey in this empirical study first addressed the question of whether the 
practical problems that were found, were related to the application of the rules or to 
externalities, for instance, a lack of funding. It was expected that a substantial part of 
the problems could be related to the application of the rules. Therefore, subjects had, 
among other things, to assess on a five-point scale to what extent the criteria cause 
evidence problems and disputes. In addition, it waspo sible for the respondents to 
add other problems they had experienced in practice.  
 The survey was followed by focus group research. In three groups, the 
problems that were identified in the survey were further explored. The groups 
consisted of eight, nine and six experts on the topic, respectively. The participants 
were chosen based on their experience in the field of bankruptcy law: two groups 
consisted of experienced practitioners and one group of practitioners with relatively 
little experience. To optimize the data that were colle ted in the focus groups, the 
results were presented to a group of practitioners that did not participate in the focus 
                                                  
16 A.P.K. Luttikhuis, R.E. Timmermans, Insolventierecht in cijfers en modellen: 
schuldeisersbenadeling en conclusies, Den Haag: BJU 2007. 




groups. A total of eight practitioners responded, two of whom had not participated in 
the survey. In general, all eight practitioners affirmed the outline of the results. Some 
had different experiences or comments with respect to parts of the results. 
 
3. TRANSACTION AVOIDANCE RULES 
 
3.1 UK Law 
The Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) contains, in essence, four grounds to challenge 
transactions that are detrimental to creditors. The first ground can be found in s.  238 
and s. 339 IA 1986. These provisions concern transactions at an undervalue, i.e. gifts, 
transactions with a gift element and other transactions in which the debtor received a 
consideration of a value considerably less than that which he gave.18 To challenge a 
transaction at undervalue with s. 238/339 IA 1986, it must have occurred in a fixed 
period before bankruptcy. In case of corporate insolvency, the period is two years 
before the onset of insolvency (often the onset of the insolvency procedure).19 The 
period is five years before the bankruptcy filing i case of personal bankruptcy.20 In 
addition, s. 240(2) IA 1986 requires that the debtor was unable to pay his debts at the 
time of the transaction. If these criteria are satisfied, a court order will be made, 
unless (1) there were reasonable grounds for believing the transaction to benefit the 
company and (2) the company which entered into the transaction did so in good faith 
and for the purpose of carrying on its business.21 
 Secondly, in appropriate circumstances transactions at an undervalue can be 
challenged using s. 423 IA 1986. This section contains rules on transactions that 
defraud creditors. It can be seen as a complement to s. 238 IA 1986 in attacking 
transactions at an undervalue as s. 423 IA 1986 does n t require that the transaction 
has taken place in a fixed period. Instead, it requir s a purpose to prejudice creditors. 
Therefore, the wider scope of s. 423 compared to s. 238 is restricted by the 
requirement of ‘a purpose to prejudice’. 
 The third ground to challenge transactions that are detrimental to creditors is 
stated in s. 239 (and s. 340) IA 1986. To successfully challenge a preference, a factual 
                                                  
18 For references to case law, see L. Doyle, A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and 
Commentary, Jordan Publishing: Bristol 2006, pp. 294-296, and R. Parry, Transaction avoidance in 
insolvencies, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 72. 
19 S. 240(1)(a) IA 1986. 
20 S. 341(1)(a) IA 1986. 
21 S. 238(5) IA 1986. 
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preference is required. This type of preference can be described as a transaction which 
places a creditor, surety or guarantor in a better position than the person would have 
been in if the preference had not been given.22 In addition, to successfully void a 
preference, the transaction must have occurred six months before the onset of 
insolvency23, and the debtor must have had the intention to prefer at the time of the 
preference24. In corporate insolvency, if a preference is given to a person connected 
with the company, the company is presumed to have hd t is intention unless it is 
proved that this was not the case.25  
Cases in which a transaction was most readily seen as preferential were those 
in which the counterparty was a person connected with the company.26 Therefore, s. 
239 IA 1986 is often successfully applied to cases where a company reimbursed the 
loan that was provided by a director of the company.27  
In other cases, a desire is seldom assumed. For example, if the counterparty 
exerts pressure on the debtor28 or if the preference takes place within the framework 
of a reorganisation process,29 it is probable that a court will not assume an intention to 
prefer. In other words, a plausible explanation for the transaction will often lead to the 
conclusion that the transaction was not preferential.30 Consequently, only three 
reported cases exist in which a court has considered a preference to be in favour of a 
person other than a connected person.31  
                                                  
22 S. 239(4) IA 1986. 
23 S. 240(1)(a) IA 1986. Two years if the counterparty is a connected party, see s. 240(1)(b). 
24 Bennett et al., Vulnerable transactions in corporate insolvency, Oxford: Hart 2003; Ian F. Fletcher, 
The law of insolvency, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2002, p. 160. See also Wills v Corfe Joinery Ltd [1998] 2 
BCLC 75. 
25 For details, see Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass [1972] AC 153, HL. The expression “person connected 
with the company” is defined by s. 249 in conjunction with s. 435. 
26 For references to cases, see L. Sealy, D. Milman, An otated Guide to the Insolvency Legislation 
2006/2007, vol. 1, Sweet & Maxwell 2006, p. 263. 
27 L. Doyle, A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, Jordan Publishing: Bristol 
2006, p. 300; Bennett et al., Vulnerable transactions in corporate insolvency, Oxford: Hart 2003; I.F. 
Fletcher, The law of insolvency, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2002, p. 140. For examples, s e Re Lewis v DKG 
Contractors Ltd [1990] BCC 903; Re Exchange Travel Holdings Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 524; Wills v Corfe 
Joinery Ltd [1998] 2 BCLC 75; Re Brian D Pierson (Contractors) Ltd [2001] 1 BCLC 275. 
28 R. Parry, Transaction avoidance in insolvencies, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 156. See 
also Re MC Bacon Ltd [1990] BCC 78. 
29 Re Lewis’s of Leicester Ltd [1995] BCC 514. 
30 L. Doyle, A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, Jordan Publishing: Bristol 
2006, p. 299; R. Parry, Transaction avoidance in insolvencies, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 
155. See also Re Fairway Magazines Ltd [1992] BCC 924: ‘If the company is influenced by “proper 
commercial considerations” and not by a “positive wish to improve the creditor's position in the event of its 
insolvent liquidation”, then the debenture will be valid. 
31 L. Doyle, A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, Jordan Publishing: Bristol 
2006, p. 299, referring to Re Living Images Ltd [1996] BCC 112; Re Agriplant Services Ltd [1997] 
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 The fourth ground can be found in s. 245 IA 1986. This section provides rules 
for attacking floating charges: a charge that is created in favour of a person who is 
connected with the company can be challenged if it was entered into two years before 
the onset of insolvency. In addition, the charge must have been created within twelve 
months of the onset of insolvency. Moreover, the debtor must be insolvent (i.e. unable 
to pay his debts or becomes unable to pay his debts as a result of the transaction) at 
the time the charge is created in order to void a (is)charge. 
 In addition to the provisions that were described, the IA 1986 contains 
provisions for attacking specific transactions, for instance, extortionate credit 
transactions (s. 244 IA 1986) and unenforceability of liens on a company’s books or 
other records (s. 246 IA 1986). A discussion of these provisions is beyond the scope 
of this paper/article. 
If the criteria of s. 238 or 239 are satisfied, a court might make any order that 
restores the financial position of the debtor to what it would have been had the transaction 
had not taken place.32 
 
3.2 Dutch Law 
The Dutch Bankruptcy Act (DBA; Faillissementswet) provides two grounds for 
voiding a transaction that parties entered into before bankruptcy. The first ground (art. 
42 DBA) requires the office-holder (or liquidator) to prove that: 
(1) the transaction is a ‘voluntary transaction’ (art.  42 DBA), i.e. there was no 
legal obligation for the transaction or the transaction was not due at the time of 
the transaction. 
(2) the transaction prejudiced creditors. Examples of transactions that prejudice 
creditors are a gift, a transaction at undervalue (i.e. the value of the property 
sold exceeds the selling price or the purchase price of the property bought 
exceeds the actual value of the property), and a payment that was not due at 
the time the creditor was compensated. To determine wh ther a transaction 
was detrimental to the creditors, a comparison must be made between the 
actual situation and the hypothetical situation in which the transaction would 
                                                                                                                                               
BCC 842; Re Mistral Finance Ltd [2001] BCC 27. See also R. Parry, Transaction avoidance in 
insolvencies, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, p. 126. 
32 Ss 238(3) and 239(3). 
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not have taken place.33 Moreover, the loss as a result of the transaction must 
have been established at the time the court renders its judgment.34 
(3) at the time of the transaction, the debtor and counterparty knew or should have 
known that prejudice to creditors would be the consequence of the transaction 
(hence referred to as: knowledge of prejudice to creditors). This implies that 
the office-holder (or liquidator) has to prove that the debtor had financial 
difficulties at the time of the transaction. In addition, it is required that the 
counterparty was aware of or, in all fairness, should have been aware of these 
difficulties. There is a discussion in the Dutch literature on the extent to which 
the debtor should have financial difficulties.35 Empirical research 
demonstrates that most of the office-holders (or liquidators) assume that it is 
required that the bankruptcy of the debtor is imminent in order to prove the 
knowledge that is required by the law.36 Knowledge of prejudice to creditors is 
presumed if the transaction took place one year before the debtor went 
bankrupt. This presumption specifically applies if insiders are involved or if 
the transaction is a transaction at an undervalue (s.  43 and 45 DBA).  
The second ground can be found in art. 47 DBA. This section states that an 
‘obligatory transaction’, for example a payment, is not permissible if the counterparty, 
at the time of the transaction, has knowledge of the bankruptcy filing of the debtor or 
the debtor and his counterparty colluded to favour this creditor over other creditors 
(collusion criterion). Case law of the Dutch Supreme Court demonstrates that the 
collusion criterion focuses on the actual intentions f parties and (therefore) has to be 
interpreted restrictively.37 Moreover, it indicates that the sole situation in which the 
collusion criterion can be successfully invoked is in the case that person X has 
                                                  
33 HR 19 oktober 2001, NJ 2001, 654 (Diepstraten/Gilhuis q.q.). 
34 HR 19 oktober 2001, NJ 2001, 654 (Diepstraten/Gilhuis q.q.); HR 22 september 1995, NJ 1996, 706 
(Ravast/Ontvanger); HR 23 december 1949, NJ 1950, 262 (Boendermaker/Schopman). B. Wessels, 
Insolventierecht. Deel III. Gevolgen van faillietverklaring (2), Deventer: Kluwer 2003, par. 3077 ff; N.J. 
Polak, M. Pannevis, Faillissementsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 104; F.P. van Koppen, Actio 
pauliana en onrechtmatige daadvordering, Kluwer: Deventer 1998, pp. 91-92. 
35 L.J. van Eeghen, Het schemergebied vóór faillissement, Den Haag: Boom 2006, pp. 13-14 and p. 132 
ff; R.J. de Weijs, ‘Overwaardearrangementen, de actio Pauliana en de verdeling van zure vruchten’, 
WPNR 6652 (2006), p. 86; N.E.D. Faber, Verrekening, Deventer: Kluwer 2005, p. 328; N.W.M. van 
den Heuvel, Zekerheid en voorrang, Den Haag: Boom 2004; R.M. Wibier, ‘De centrale plaats van de 
wetenschap in de Pauliana’, WPNR 6548, p. 732; F.P. van Koppen, ‘Zekerheidsrechten en 
faillissementspauliana’, in: J.C. van Apeldoorn et al., Onzekere zekerheid, Kluwer: Deventer 2001, p. 
17. 
36 G. van Dijck, De faillissementspauliana: revisie van een relict, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
2006, p. 79. 
37 HR 29 juni 2001, NJ 2001, 662 (Meijs q.q./Bank of Tokyo); HR 20 november 1998, NJ 1999, 611 
(Verkerk/Tiethoff q.q.); HR 24 maart 1995, NJ 1995, 628 (Gispen q.q./IFN). 
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considerable or decisive influence on the counterparty as well as on the debtor (both 
of which are often companies).38  
If the criteria of art. 42 or 47 DBA are satisfied, the transaction is considered 
to be voidable. The current law states in art. 51 DBA that the legal effect of a 
transaction that can be qualified as not permissible is to restore the ‘old’ situation 
(before the transaction) by nullifying the transactions that parties entered into.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Incidence of suspect transactions 
 
Results 
In the UK study, office-holders (or liquidators) were requested to specify how often 
they had encountered suspect transactions. The results indicate that a majority of the 
office-holders (or liquidators) (79%-93%) encountered suspect transactions 
sometimes or rarely (Table 1). 
 












Section 238 (transactions at 
undervalue) 
1% 44,7% 48,5% 4,9% 1% 
Section 239 (preferences) 1% 23,1% 56,7% 15,4% 3,8% 
Section 245 (floating charges) 20,8% 67,3% 10,9% 1% 0% 
Section 423 (transactions 
defrauding creditors) 
12,5% 59,6% 25% 2,9% 0% 
Source: Milman/Parry 1998 
 
In the empirical study that was conducted in The Netherlands, the results demonstrate 
that office-holders (or liquidators) encountered a suspect transaction in 9% 
(companies) and 6% (natural persons) of the bankruptcy cases (Table 2).39  
 
Table 2: Incidence of suspect transactions (NL) 
                                                  
38 HR 7 maart 2003, NJ 2003, 429 (Cikam/Siemon q.q.). 
39 A.P.K. Luttikhuis, R.E. Timmermans, Insolventierecht in cijfers en modellen: 






Companies 9%  
Natural persons 6%  
Source: Luttikhuis/CBS 2007 
 
Analysis 
A conceivable explanation to interpret the differenc s which were observed is related 
to methodological issues. A comparison of the research that studied the Dutch 
bankruptcy files and the focus group research regarding the Dutch transaction 
avoidance rules demonstrates that office-holders (or liquidators) estimate the 
incidence higher than it actually is.40 In the focus group research (Van Dijck 2006), 
office-holders (or liquidators) estimated that they encounter suspect transactions in 
30% of the bankruptcies. The bankruptcy files study, however, reveals that the actual 
percentage is significantly lower (6% and 9%). Therefore, the UK results arguably 
show inaccurate estimations, i.e. the actual incidence is lower than estimated by the 
respondents. If this presumption proves to be corret, it is probable that the incidence 





Additionally, Dutch empirical research provides data regarding the outcome of cases 
in which the office-holder (or liquidator) encountered a suspect transaction. The study 
demonstrates that a suspicion by the office-holder (or liquidator) led to proceeds in 
very few cases and that there are no proceeds in a majority of the cases (67% of 
companies and 81% of natural persons). If there are proceeds in a corporate 
bankruptcy (n=189), they are mostly based on a settlement in 77% (n=145) of the 
cases and from a legal procedure in only 23% (n=44) (Table 3).41 
 
Table 3: Outcome if office-holder (or liquidator) encountered a suspect transaction (NL) 
                                                  
40 This conclusion is based on notes taken during the focus groups research. These notes can be 
requested by contacting the author of this paper. 
41 A.P.K. Luttikhuis, R.E. Timmermans, Insolventierecht in cijfers en modellen: 
schuldeisersbenadeling en conclusies, Den Haag: BJU 2007. 
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Action office-holder (or liquidator) Companies Natural persons 
Settlement 25% 11% 
Legal procedure with proceeds 8% 8% 
Legal procedure without proceeds 6% 8% 
No legal action, recovery is unlikely 29% 36% 
No legal action, insufficient funds 15% 12% 
No legal action, other reason 17% 25% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Luttikhuis/CBS 2007 
 
Under the IA 1986, proceeds are also obtained more often from settlements than from 
proceedings. According to half of the UK practitioners, disputes are settled in a majority 
of cases (Table 4). 
 











Section 238 (transactions at undervalue) 9,4% 18,9% 15% 56,6% 
Section 239 (preferences) 9,3% 16,7% 14,8% 59,3% 
Section 245 (floating charges) 13,9% 19,4% 16,7% 50% 
Section 423 (transactions defrauding creditors) 21% 21% 14,8% 43,2% 
Source: Milman/Parry 1998 
 
In case of litigation (Table 3), more than half of the respondents (50%-60%) indicate 
that they bring a case to trial sometimes or rarely (Table 5). 
 











Section 238 (transactions at undervalue) 38,6% 18,8% 12,9% 29,7% 
Section 239 (preferences) 33,7% 22,8% 13,9% 29,7% 
Section 245 (floating charges) 50,5% 15,6% 4,6% 29,4% 
Section 423 (transactions defrauding creditors) 49,4% 12,9% 10,6% 27,1% 
Source: Milman/Parry 1998 
 
In addition, if a case is brought to trial, the matter is often/usually dropped without a 
settlement, according to 50%-60% of the respondents (Table 6). 
 













Section 238 (transactions at undervalue) 20% 27,3% 41,8% 10,9% 
Section 239 (preferences) 19,4% 41,9% 22,6% 19,4% 
Section 245 (floating charges) 21,9% 24,4% 36,6% 17,1% 
Section 423 (transactions defrauding creditors) 17,4% 21,7% 43,5% 17,4% 
Source: Milman/Parry 1998 
 
Analysis 
When comparing the two empirical studies, the results demonstrate that most of the 
disputes are conducted (and settled) in the shadow of the law. Additionally, the results 
indicate that there are no proceeds in a substantial number (if not the majority) of 
cases in which the office-holder (or liquidator) encounters a suspect transaction.  
 
4.3 Reasons for not initiating legal proceedings 
 
Results 
As can be seen, the majority of cases where the office-holder (or liquidator) 
encountered suspect transactions does not result in egal proceedings and/or a 
settlement. Two principal causes can be identified from the UK and Dutch studies for 
not challenging suspect transactions. 
In the UK, lack of funding and evidence problems are important obstacles for 
successfully attacking a suspect transaction (26%-37 ) (Table 7).  
 
Table 7: Reasons for not initiating legal actions (UK) 
 S. 238 S. 239 S. 245 S. 423 
Lack of funding 63,9% 60,4% 62,3% 60,1% 
Lack of evidence 26,4% 28,1% 31,9% 37,3% 
Other reason(s) 9,7% 11,5% 5,8% 2,6% 
Source: Milman/Parry 1998 
 
In addition, the Luttikhuis/Timmermans study42 demonstrates that, in The 
Netherlands, unlikely recovery is a major cause (ca. 50%) for not initiating a 
settlement or legal proceedings (Table 8). 
 
                                                  
42 A.P.K. Luttikhuis, R.E. Timmermans, Insolventierecht in cijfers en modellen: 
schuldeisersbenadeling en conclusies, Den Haag: BJU 2007. 
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Table 8: Reasons for not initiating legal actions (NL) 
 Companies Natural persons 
No legal action, recovery is unlikely 48% 47% 
No legal action, insufficient funds 25% 18% 
No legal action, other reason 27% 35% 
Total 100% 100% 
Source: Luttikhuis/CBS 2007 
 
The second Dutch empirical study provides similar results (Table 9). However, it also 
indicates that the expectation that, although recovry is likely, the costs exceed the 
proceeds, is a major obstacle for successfully voiding suspect transactions (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Reasons for not initiating legal actions (NL) 
 
Never / (Very) 
rarely 
Not rarely / not 
often 
(Very) often 
Recovery is unlikely 6% 16% 78% 
Lack of funding / evidence 21% 25% 55% 
The expectation that, although recovery is likely, 
the costs exceed the proceeds 
16% 26% 58% 
Source: Van Dijck 2006 
 
In addition to the Luttikhuis/Timmermans research, the second Dutch empirical study 
indicates that evidence problems are an important obs acle to prevent office-holders 
(or liquidators) from challenging suspect transactions successfully.43 
 
Analysis 
The studies identify the lack of funding and evidential difficulties as a major obstacle 
for not initiating legal actions. However, insufficient funds is seen as less of a 
problem in The Netherlands than in the UK. This canp rtly be explained by the way 
in which actions are funded. Under the DBA, the costs that the office-holder (or 
liquidator) makes can be paid as expenses of the winding up of bankruptcies. Under 
the IA 1986, this was only permitted in certain circumstances.44 
The Insolvency Rules were changed in 2002, i.e., after the UK study was 
conducted (1998). Consequently, office-holders (or liquidators) are currently allowed 
                                                  
43 G. van Dijck, De faillissementspauliana: revisie van een relict (diss. Tilburg), Nijmegen: Wolf Legal 
Publishers 2006. 
44 Re Floor Fourteen Ltd Lewis v. Inland Revenue Commissioners [2001] 3 All ER 499. 
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to charge the costs of insolvency litigation as an expense of winding up.45 As a result 
of this change, the problem of lack of funding may h ve decreased since the research 
was conducted. 
 The problem of unlikely recovery as a major obstacle can easily be explained. 
Previous to challenging a transaction, the office-holder (or liquidator) will, among 
other things, verify if it is worthwhile to initiate proceedings. For example, he or she 
will verify whether recovery is likely and whether the expected proceeds exceed the 
costs that will probably be made. This investigation can compel office-holders (or 
liquidators) not to challenge a transaction, even if the transaction was, in their 
opinion, not permissible.  
It is, however, rather remarkable that the UK study does not identify unlikely 
recovery as an obstacle. By contrast, the problem of unlikely recovery is seen as a 
major obstacle for successfully invoking the transaction avoidance rules in The 
Netherlands. Supposedly, respondents in the UK resea ch conceived unlikely 
recovery as lack of funding. 
Notwithstanding methodological differences and the differences in the results, 
it becomes obvious that the major obstacles for not bringing a case to court are, to a 
large extent, related to ‘externalities’ as insufficient funds, unlikely recovery, and a 
negative cost-benefit ratio. Therefore, it is surprising to observe that the legal doctrine 
mostly focuses on the transaction avoidance rules and not (or less) on the externalities 
mentioned. This at least applies to the UK as well as to The Netherlands, and, to my 
knowledge, also to Belgium and Germany. 
 
4.4 Application problems and difficulties 
 
Although legal scholars mostly focus on the transaction avoidance rules, little is 
known about to what extent the transaction avoidance rules generate practical 
problems. The evidence problems and other application problems were further 
explored the Van Dijck 2006 study. Because of the (supposed) importance of these 
application problems and difficulties, it can be considered worthwhile to explore 
these, even though an UK counterpart of this research is not available. 
 
                                                  
45 Insolvency (Amendment) (No 2) Rules 2002, SI 2002/2712 Sch 1 (2), para 23 amend Insolvency 




Based on the focus group data of the Dutch empirical research, two important 
observations can be made for the Dutch transaction avoidance rules. The first 
concerns the aspect of professionalisation. Banks ad large companies are more aware 
of, and specialized in, the transaction avoidance rul s. These creditors can anticipate 
and effectively neutralise the impact of transaction avoidance by, for example, 
obtaining security rights outside suspect periods. By contrast, small and medium-
sized businesses have no knowledge of the existence of transaction avoidance rules, 
according to the participants of the focus groups. For these creditors, it is unlikely that 
the transaction avoidance rules affect their behaviour. Therefore, there is presumably 
little preventive effect in these cases. 
 A second important observation is that the criteria are too limited. More 
specifically, creditors with influence, such as banks or shareholders, determine the 
direction of the debtor (company) without having to account for influencing or 
forcing the debtor to do certain transactions. These persons or entities are generally 
better informed with regard to the financial situation of the debtor than most other 
creditors.  
This specifically applies to banks. Although banks initiate and contribute to 
successful reorganisations, they often notice, more than other creditors, when 
bankruptcy is proximate. According to the participants, a bank will then use legal 
instruments, for example security interests, to secure its own interests. In practice, the 
debtor and his counterparty create a legal ground for one or more transactions which 
will take place in the future at a time when the financial situation of the debtor is 
healthy. The future transaction will then be considere  to be obligatory at the time the 
transaction is carried out. 
In The Netherlands, it is common for banks/lenders to oblige the borrower to 
pledge current as well as future property (art. 20 General Terms and Conditions of the 
Banks; Algemene Bankvoorwaarden). As a result, any subsequent pledges are based 
on that existing obligation and can only be avoided pursuant to art. 47 DBA. If the 
debtor (borrower) enters into bankruptcy, such an obligation forces the office-holder 
(or liquidator) to prove consultation or knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, which is 
seen as very difficult, in contrast to knowledge of prejudice, which is easier to prove. 
Consequently, most of the assets in a bankruptcy are allocated to the bank. Due to a 
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lack of assets in the bankrupt estate, office-holders (or liquidators) do not have 
enough funds to initiate proceedings or even to liquidate. 
 The impression in the focus groups was that most of the participants, 
especially those with experience, urge the legislator to oblige banks (and other 
creditors with influence) to be held accountable for their actions in the period before 
the debtor/borrower went bankrupt.  
 
Intentions 
In general, the results indicate that if criteria emphasize the intent of the parties to the 
transaction, this substantially increases the risk of evidential difficulties (Table 10).46  
 
Table 10: Office-holders’ (or liquidators’) perception of evidential difficulties  (NL) 
 (Very) difficult (Very) easy 
Qualifying a transaction as voluntary 
or obligatory 
7% 69% 
Proving that the transaction harmed 
creditors 
20% 39% 
Proving collusion 75% 6% 
Proving knowledge of prejudicing 
creditors if a presumption of 
knowledge is applicable 
7% 66% 
Proving knowledge of prejudicing 
creditors when the knowledge is NOT 
presumed 
75% 4% 
Proving knowledge of the bankruptcy 
filing 
39% 30% 
Source: Van Dijck 2006 
 
Here, the intentions of the parties to a contract hve proved to be a deficient basis for 
assessing the permissibility of the transaction. For instance, it is (very) difficult to 
prove collusion, according to 75% of the office-holders (or liquidators). This 
corresponds to the claim of Doyle and Keay, holding that “[i]t is probably notable, 
and indicative of the difficulty of establishing a desire, that there are apparently only 
three reported cases in which a court has found there to be a preference in favour of a 
person other than a connected person”.47 
 
                                                  
46 The survey among UK practitioners provides similar results, see D. Milman & R. Parry, ‘A study of 
the operation of transactional avoidance mechanisms in corporate insolvency practice’, ILA Research 
Report, 1998. 
47 L. Doyle, A. Keay, Insolvency Legislation: Annotations and Commentary, Jordan Publishing: Bristol 




The same percentage (75%) applies for proving knowledge of prejudicing creditors if 
the knowledge that is required is not presumed. However, if knowledge is presumed, 
the opposite applies. The data show that in cases in which knowledge is presumed on 
a statutory basis (s. 43 DBA), it is (very) easy for 66% of the office-holders (or 
liquidators) to prove knowledge on the part of the debtor and its counterparty. As a 
result of the fact that the other party must prove the opposite, it can be concluded that 
a presumption or shift of the burden of proof will determine the outcome (permissible 
or not permissible) to a large extent. In other words, the chances of successfully 
voiding a transaction are substantial if a presumption or shift is applicable and slim if 
a presumption or shift is not applicable. 
 The evidential difficulties were further explored in the focus groups. 
Participants were asked how they prove knowledge (and intentions). They explained 
that knowledge is often easy to prove if counterparties are connected with or related 
to the debtor, for instance if the counterparty of the debtor was family or an allied 
company. However, the earlier the transaction took place, the more difficult it is to 
prove the knowledge required by the law. 
If a presumption is not applicable, office-holders (or liquidators) use (e-mail) 
correspondence, notes and statements by witnesses, and employees, etc., to prove the 
knowledge that is required by the law. A majority of the office-holders (or 
liquidators) that participated in the focus groups can sometimes rely on conversations 
with, for instance, employees and accountants. Occasion lly, prior knowledge is 
assumed if the transaction can be considered to be unusual. Office-holders (or 
liquidators) also use this type of information to prove knowledge on the part of the 
debtor. In case of an ‘obligatory’ transaction (payments), however, where it is 
required to prove knowledge of the bankruptcy filing, this type of information is often 
discovered accidentally. The focus groups data indicate that the success office-holders 
(or liquidators) achieve with this criterion is generally the result of coincidence (for 
example, the office-holder (or liquidator) discovers a letter sent by a creditor that 
provides evidence for a payment that is regarded as not permissible).  
 
Disputes 
The Dutch study did not merely focus on evidence problems, but also on the extent to 
which the Dutch transaction avoidance rules cause disputes. In general, the nature of 
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the discussions and disputes depends on what type of counterparty the office-holder 
(or liquidator) faces. In essence, three types can be distinguished: the expert; the 
attorney who is not specialised in bankruptcy law; nd the layman who has no legal 
expertise. The focus group data indicate that attorneys who are not specialised in the 
field of insolvency law can be easily persuaded that t e transaction is not permissible. 
Laymen, especially directors of (group) companies, find that in practice they are often 
forced to make transactions which turn out to be detrim ntal to creditors (“there were 
no other options” or “I had to carry out the transaction as part of the reorganisation 
process”). It is likely they will challenge a claim of the office-holder (or liquidator) if 
he or she states that the transaction was made voluntarily. Office-holders (or 
liquidators) consider these types of claim easy to parry.  
If the counterparty is assisted by an expert in the field of insolvency law, he 
will often try to find legal arguments to contend the claim of the office-holder (or 
liquidator) that the transaction was not obligatory, to show that the creditors’ interests 
were harmed, and to prove that his client knew or should have known that the 
transaction would harm creditors. Although office-holders (or liquidators) sometimes 
encounter significant opposition from an expert, they prefer communicating with this 
type of counterparty. According to the participants, an expert contributes to 
channelling the discussion or dispute.  
More specifically, it can be concluded that the requirement of knowledge of 
prejudicing creditors causes the most disputes in comparison to the other requirements 
(Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Incidence of grounds for disputes (NL) 
 











The qualification of a transaction as voluntary or 
obligatory 
37% 28% 36% 51% 
Evidence for the transaction harming creditors 14% 7% 60% 64% 
Evidence for collusion 30% 45% 37% 25% 
Evidence of knowledge for prejudicing creditors  8% 6% 68% 66% 
Evidence of knowledge for the bankruptcy filing 41% 54% 23% 15% 
Source: Van Dijck 2006 
 
In addition, it is rather remarkable that the qualification of a transaction as voluntary 
or obligatory gives rise to (relatively) many disputes between the office-holder (or 
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liquidator) and the counterparty. The focus groups data show that disputes often 
concern different perceptions of what is obligatory and what is voluntary. More 
specifically, the legal definition of obligatory and voluntary does not correspond with 
what, for example, directors of companies consider to be voluntary and obligatory 
(for instance, a typical defence of an entrepreneur is that the suspect transaction was 
part of a reorganisation process and that it was, therefore, obligatory).  
 It is also remarkable that 39% of the office-holders (or liquidators) experience 
that it is (very) easy to demonstrate that a transaction is detrimental to creditors, while 
the requirement causes disputes (very) often according to two thirds of the 
respondents. This oddity was further explored in the focus groups. According to the 
participants, the evidence of detriment is often arbitrary and, therefore, relatively easy 
to challenge. 
Firstly, the question of whether a transaction prejudices creditors is not purely 
a mathematical one. The answer to the question of whether a transaction is 
detrimental to creditors (also) depends on factors such as the probability of the 
transaction triggering other (positive or negative) events. 
Secondly, it is often difficult to determine the value of goods, services and 
particularly goodwill. For example, surveyors can come to substantially different 
assessments. As a result, if is difficult to answer the question if a transaction was 
detrimental to creditors. This point was also noted in the interviews in the UK study, 
which indicated that the burden of proving undervalue (s.  238 IA 1986) is relatively 
easy, but that most of the evidential difficulties are caused by establishing a 
significant undervalue.  
Thirdly, in one focus group it was noticed that challenging the proof of 
detriment is “part of the game”. These three circumstances explain why the 
requirement of detriment gives rise to a relatively substantial number of disputes.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The comparison between empirical data from UK and Dutch research provides 
valuable information regarding the question to which extent the transaction avoidance 





The incidence of suspect transactions arguably ranges somewhere between 6%-9% 
(NL) and 10-40% (UK). Practitioners, however, arguably perceive a higher incidence 
of suspect transactions than is actually the case. Th refore, it is probable that the 
incidence of suspect transactions is substantially lower than the alleged 40%. 
 More striking are the similarities regarding the problems that occur when 
invoking the transaction avoidance rules in a situation in which a suspect transaction 
is encountered. In this respect, both the UK and The Netherlands share the difficulty 
of evidence problems and insufficient funds. These ar  seen as major obstacles to 
successfully invoking the transaction avoidance ruls. Apart from funding problems, 
the comparison indicates that if criteria focus on the intent of the parties to the 
transaction, this significantly increases the risk of evidential difficulties. Therefore, an 
accumulation of difficulties takes place in which funding problems reinforce 
evidential difficulties, and vice versa. 
 Additionally, the majority of the disputes are conducted in the shadow of the (UK 
and Dutch) law. As a result, proceeds are obtained substantially more frequently from 
settlements than from proceedings. This finding hasan important methodological 
implication with regard to conducting legal research in the field of transaction avoidance 
rules, as I will argue (see “methodological implications”).  
 
5.2 Reforming transaction avoidance rules 
The solution for the major difficulties in Dutch and UK law is, obviously, to improve 
insolvency funding and to reduce the office-holder’s (or liquidator’s) burden of proof. 
With regard to reducing the burden of proof, however, transaction avoidance is a 
highly delicate matter. On the one hand, one does nt want to restrict companies and 
individuals in conducting transactions that are desirable from an economic point of 
view. On the other hand, funding problems and evident al difficulties lead to the rules 
being ineffective, i.e. can hardly be successfully invoked, which implies that 
transactions that must be considered as “not permissible”, are left untouched. 
 Although transaction avoidance is a delicate matter, one could (and should) 
strive to find a balance between avoiding transactions and facilitating economically 
desirable transactions. A successful method is a shift of the burden of proof. The 
Dutch data indicate that a  presumption or shift of the burden of proof is an effective 
means to reduce evidential difficulties. For example, in cases of transactions at 
undervalue (voluntary transactions), evidential difficulties are seen as less of a 
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problem than in cases of preferences (obligatory transactions). Conversely, the UK 
data show merely small differences between evidential difficulties regarding 
preferences and transactions at undervalue. This could imply that the presumption 
with regard to connected persons works adequately, since connected persons often 
can induce or even force the debtor to make preferential transactions.  
 It is evident that reducing evidential difficulties will supposedly have a 
positive effect on the existing funding problems. A shift of burden, for example, not 
only improves the office-holder’s (or liquidator’s) evidential position. It also makes 
fact finding and procedures less costly. 
 Obvious and remarkable at the same time is the aspct of insolvency funding. 
Although funding is considered as a major obstacle for avoidance litigation, very little 
research has been done in this field. In this respect, I can only refer to one report 
which provides a global overview of different fundig strategies.48 Therefore, studies 
and research regarding the possibilities, effects and results of the various forms of 
state and private funding can be highly recommended. 
 
5.3 Final remark 
The preceding conclusions demonstrate that UK and Dutch law share similar difficulties 
regarding the application of the transaction avoidance rules. This indicates that at least 
some difficulties are universal and subsistent in tra saction avoidance rules. Therefore, a 
comparative or international approach of transaction avoidance should be encouraged. 




                                                  
48 Assetless Insolvencies Report – January 2005, 
<http://www.insolvencyreg.org/sub_publications/docs/IAIR%20Assetless%20Insolvencies%20Report
%20V103.pdf>. 
